Full Report
Our partners at Clear Guidance Partners experienced the value of our EDR capabilities in real-time, pitting them against an active ransomware attack.
Analysis Summary
# Incident Report: Ransomware Attack Against Clear Guidance Partners Client
## Executive Summary
During the public beta of Huntress Managed EDR, a Texas-based MSP (Clear Guidance Partners) encountered an active ransomware attack targeting a client environment. The incident involved abnormal network traffic and antivirus alerts triggered by suspicious PowerShell activity. Huntress SOC analysts utilized near real-time EDR telemetry to intervene, disrupting the attack before it could reach the final encryption stage.
## Incident Details
- **Discovery Date:** February 2022 (during Public Beta phase)
- **Incident Date:** February 2022
- **Affected Organization:** Client of Clear Guidance Partners
- **Sector:** Managed Service Provider (MSP) / Client Sector Undisclosed
- **Geography:** Texas, USA
## Timeline of Events
### Initial Access
- **Date/Time:** February 2022
- **Vector:** Not explicitly detailed in the text, though the investigation was triggered by abnormal traffic.
- **Details:** The attack was identified shortly after the deployment of Managed EDR during its public beta rollout.
### Lateral Movement
- **Details:** The threat actor attempted to use PowerShell and other living-off-the-land techniques to navigate the network, which were flagged by the EDR's process monitoring.
### Data Exfiltration/Impact
- **Impact:** The attack was disrupted before full execution. There was no confirmed data exfiltration or successful widespread encryption reported in the case study.
### Detection & Response
- **Detection:** The Huntress 24/7 SOC team detected abnormal traffic and suspicious process executions. Simultaneously, the MSP (Anthony at Clear Guidance) observed antivirus alerts regarding unauthorized attempts.
- **Response Actions:** SOC analysts used Managed EDR to conduct near real-time forensics, tracing malicious processes back to the root cause and isolating the threat.
## Attack Methodology
- **Initial Access:** Suspicious network traffic (Specific entry point not disclosed).
- **Defense Evasion:** Use of PowerShell to execute commands (Living-off-the-land).
- **Lateral Movement:** Monitored via process executions and metadata.
- **Impact:** Ransomware (Attempted).
## Impact Assessment
- **Financial:** Minimal; prevented significant ransom demands and recovery costs.
- **Data Breach:** None reported; prevented during the early stages of the attack.
- **Operational:** Limited to the remediation window; business continuity was maintained.
- **Reputational:** Positive; validated the MSP's stack and the EDR's efficacy.
## Indicators of Compromise
- **Behavioral indicators:** Abnormal network traffic, unauthorized PowerShell process execution, and metadata associated with ransomware preparation.
## Response Actions
- **Containment:** Real-time process monitoring allowed the SOC to identify and halt malicious process chains.
- **Eradication:** Removal of persistence mechanisms and termination of malicious shells.
- **Recovery:** Restoration of normal operations after SOC confirmation of a clean environment.
## Lessons Learned
- **Prevention is not enough:** Traditional preventive tools (AV/Firewall) missed the initial stages; the "safety net" of EDR was required to catch the breach in progress.
- **Timing is Critical:** The transition from initial access to ransomware encryption happens rapidly; near real-time telemetry is essential for intervention.
- **Human-led Investigation:** Automated alerts (AV) were enhanced by SOC analysts who could interpret the context of the PowerShell commands.
## Recommendations
- **Adopt Managed EDR:** SMBs and MSPs should move beyond simple prevention to include active detection and response capabilities.
- **Map to MITRE ATT&CK:** Use frameworks to understand threat actor behaviors (persistence vs. lateral movement) to better prioritize alerts.
- **24/7 Monitoring:** Security monitoring must be constant, as attackers do not operate on standard business hours.