In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtio-net: fix len check in receive_big() receive_big() bounds the device-announced length by (big_packets_num_skbfrags + 1) * PAGE_SIZE. That is still too loose: add_recvbuf_big() sets sg[1] to start at offset sizeof(struct padded_vnet_hdr) into the first page, so the chain actually carries hdr_len + (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(padded_vnet_hdr)) + big_packets_num_skbfrags * PAGE_SIZE bytes -- 20 bytes less than the check allows for the common hdr_len == 12 case. A malicious virtio backend can announce a len in that gap. page_to_skb() then walks one frag past the page chain, storing a NULL page->private into skb_shinfo()->frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS], which is both an out-of-bounds write past the static frag array and a NULL frag handed up the rx path. Bound len by the size add_recvbuf_big() actually advertised.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
| Attack Vector | LOCAL |
|---|---|
| Attack Complexity | LOW |
| Privileges Required | NONE |
| User Interaction | NONE |
| Scope | UNCHANGED |
| Confidentiality Impact | HIGH |
| Integrity Impact | HIGH |
| Availability Impact | HIGH |
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Type: Secondary
Exploitability Score: 2.5
Impact Score: 5.9