Full Report
John Strand // In this webcast, we walk through different tools to establish and test your Command and Control (C2) detection capabilities. Why does this matter? Almost all organizations we […] The post WEBCAST: Two Covert C2 Channels appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
Analysis Summary
# Tool/Technique: Covert Command and Control (C2) Channels
## Overview
The focus of this information is testing an organization's ability to detect outgoing Command and Control (C2) channels, specifically exploring methods to establish *covert* C2 channels. The context highlights that most organizations tested by the source fail to detect these outgoing communication channels.
## Technical Details
- Type: Technique (Focus on C2 establishment methods)
- Platform: Not explicitly limited, but C2 testing generally targets common enterprise environments (Windows, network infrastructure).
- Capabilities: Establishing communication channels between compromised hosts and an attacker-controlled server that are deliberately obfuscated or disguised to evade detection.
- First Seen: N/A (Relates to a webcast from April 20, 2017, focusing on existing detection gaps).
## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Since the article discusses *testing detection capabilities* against C2 rather than detailing a specific malware/tool's functionality, the mapping focuses on the general technique of establishing C2.
- **TA0011 - Command and Control**
- **T1071 - Application Layer Protocol**
- *Focus on specific protocols used for covert C2.*
- **T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer** (Implied, if tools are downloaded via C2)
## Functionality
### Core Capabilities
- Establishing persistent communication paths between an internal system and an external adversary (Command and Control).
- Testing the effectiveness of Blue Team monitoring solutions against common C2 traffic patterns.
### Advanced Features
- Utilizing "covert" methods to hide C2 traffic within seemingly legitimate network flows, making them difficult for traditional security monitoring to identify. *Note: The summary does not specify *which* covert channels were discussed in the webcast, only the general concept.*
## Indicators of Compromise
The source material does not provide specific IOCs for a single malware family but rather refers to general C2 activity:
- File Hashes: N/A
- File Names: N/A
- Registry Keys: N/A
- Network Indicators: Traffic patterns indicative of suspicious outbound C2 communications (defanged examples would depend on the specific technique being tested, e.g., unusual DNS queries, HTTP requests to non-standard ports).
- Behavioral Indicators: Outbound network beaconing that bypasses DLP or firewall inspection rules.
## Associated Threat Actors
The techniques discussed are generally employed by virtually all sophisticated threat actors who rely on persistent remote access. The associated training materials mention tools like Empire, suggesting APTs and professional penetration testing teams utilize these concepts.
## Detection Methods
The entire premise of the webcast is a challenge to existing detection mechanisms:
- Signature-based detection: Likely ineffective against well-designed covert channels.
- Behavioral detection: Required to spot unusual patterns in legitimate protocols (e.g., high volume or unusual timing in DNS or HTTP traffic). The webcast author (John Strand) is associated with tools like RITA, suggesting network flow analysis as a critical detection method.
- YARA rules: N/A
## Mitigation Strategies
- Implementation of advanced network monitoring solutions capable of deep packet inspection and behavioral anomaly detection.
- Strict egress filtering and monitoring of all outbound traffic paths.
- Utilizing tools like RITA (mentioned in the context links) for monitoring network anomalies.
## Related Tools/Techniques
The surrounding content mentions several related or foundational tools used in C2 and post-exploitation:
- Empire (Mentioned in a related article link: "Empire Bootstrapping v2")
- MailSniper (Mentioned in a related article link)
- RITA (Mentioned in resource links, a tool for C2 detection)