The Bear Necessities: A Look at the Drivers, Dynamics, and Applications of the Pro-Russia Influence Ecosystem

Written by: James Sadowski, Alden Wahlstrom Introduction Four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the pro-Russia influence ecosystem has evolved from a tool of war back into a global strategic asset. Since the mobilization of this ecosystem to support frontline objectives, we have witnessed the expedited development of new influence assets linked to multiple, expansive, covert information operations (IO) campaigns and a revitalization of pro-Russia hacktivism at an unprecedented scale. While this threat activity initially adapted to encompass Ukraine-related priorities, it is gradually pivoting back to established Russian influence objectives for which the ecosystem was originally honed. This shift is significant because it likely signals increased focus outside of Ukraine, warning that pro-Russia influence activity targeting the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other top targeting priorities may intensify. Ultimately, the war in Ukraine has provided a critical feedback loop for Russia to refine its influence activity, lessons that we anticipate will be applied as the ecosystem continues to reorient toward global strategic objectives while maintaining focus on Ukraine. Further, recent pro-Russia IO indicates the continued expansion of already diverse tactics, and the increasing use of generative AI tooling for planning, research, and content creation marks a forward trend in pro-Russia IO. Meanwhile, new and different actors have adopted IO tactics to meet an increasingly diverse set of challenges, signaling growing Russian reliance on influence tactics. Together, these trends likely demonstrate the Kremlin's perception of these tactics as cost effective and successful. The interconnected nature of the ecosystem's disparate components makes it resilient to limited scope disruptions, which defenders must consider to effectively mitigate pro-Russia influence threats. The Ecosystem at a Glance: Objectives, Targeting, and Tactics Russia's modern approach to information operations is built on the conceptual foundation of Soviet-era "active measures" adapted for the digital age. Alongside disruptive cyberattacks dating back to the early 2000s, the Kremlin has increasingly harnessed internet-based platforms for espionage and information operations. Russia's approach has evolved from rudimentary, singular operations into a complex, self-sustaining environment intentionally curated by the Russian Government that blends overt, covert, and independent elements to advance Kremlin interests both at home and abroad. Core Influence Objectives GTIG’s observations suggest the primary strategic motivations driving the pro-Russia influence ecosystem fall into five categories, each aiming to achieve military and/or political objectives through psychological manipulation of the target audience (Figure 1). Collectively, these objectives informally depict a global influence strategy: through the furthest reach of its influence, the Kremlin seeks to diminish Western primacy and advance Russia's global position; within its surrounding region, it strives to retain and return Moscow's dominance; and at home, it works to ensure the stability of the political regime. Figure 1: Core objectives of the pro-Russia influence ecosystem Targeting Pro-Russia influence operations are pivoting from the near singular focus on Ukraine that dominated the ecosystem since 2022. We expect influence operations advancing Russia's war-specific interests to continue. However, as Russia seeks to reemerge from international isolation, we have increasingly observed a concurrent focus on pre-war pro-Russia influence objectives. The current and historical targeting scope of each ecosystem component exposes both the Kremlin's global ambitions and the realistic limitations of its power projection. State-owned media organizations produce content intended to serve populations across six continents, but in recent years, sanctions and other factors have limited its production and distribution. Meanwhile, covert operations have appeared more limited in scope, primarily targeting the West and countries surrounding Russia, with intermittent operations targeting the Middle East and Africa, indicating that finite resources necessarily limit these operations (Figure 2). Top Regional Targets The United States and Europe: The Kremlin has long viewed the West as a top adversary of Russia. Accordingly, the US and Europe are top targets of covert pro-Russia information operations, especially aimed at undermining political stability within these countries and the unity between them. NATO and the EU embody the collective "West" and are Russia's perceived top adversaries, second only to the US independently. Russia's "Near Abroad": Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow has asserted that the countries that formerly comprised part of the USSR now reside in Russia's so-called "sphere of influence." Covert influence targeting this region directly reflects Moscow's assertion that Russia is a world power entitled to special privileges within its neighborhood. The Middle East and Africa: Over the past decade, Russian efforts to reassert itself as a global power have included high-profile investments in cultivating Russia's standing in the Middle East and Africa. Covert pro-Russia influence activity is likely deployed in tandem as intended support for other Russian initiatives in these regions. Russia Domestic: Internally targeted covert IO is a well-established component of pro-Russia influence activity, deployed by regime-aligned actors to promote Kremlin policies and repress opposition voices. Targeted Entities and Global Events The Olympics: Russia has long viewed Olympic participation as a point of national prestige, and GTIG has observed notable Russian influence activity targeting the Olympics in the face of Russian participation bans. War in Ukraine: The war in Ukraine has been a key driver of Russia's influence activity, including attempts to influence events on the ground as well as influence activity intended to advance Moscow's interests elsewhere vis-a-vis the war. GTIG expects that Ukraine will remain a priority in Russia's targeting calculus during the post-conflict phase following any future peace agreements. Elections: Election targeting aligns with multiple Russian influence objectives, including attempting to undermine confidence in democratic institutions as well as internally weakening perceived Western adversaries. These operations regularly target elections in countries that are already prioritized by ongoing pro-Russia influence activity. Ad Hoc Geopolitical Flashpoints and Global Events: Russian influence actors have a history of pivoting activity to engage with emerging geopolitical developments and events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic or the 2026 Middle East conflict. This flexible target selection often overlaps or is aligned with other Russian priorities, making previously observed Russian influence activity helpful in anticipating which events may be appropriated. Figure 2: Priority targets of the ecosystem Tactics Converging geopolitical and technological developments make the evolution of pro-Russia influence tactics a particularly important space to monitor right now. The pro-Russia influence ecosystem expanded to support the war effort, bringing change across the spectrum of activity and providing operators the opportunity to hone their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in the rapid feedback loop of war. Meanwhile, the emergence and increased democratization of generative AI tooling has brought both promised and already realized opportunities to support all phases of the IO lifecycle. The following are a sample of key tactics that illustrate how pro-Russia actors currently blend well-tested methods with new technological developments to reach audiences through diverse means: Generative AI: GTIG has observed pro-Russia influence actors increasingly leverage AI tooling to support different stages of their operations, including support for planning and general research as well as content creation. Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) is closely tracking the transition from nascent AI-enabled operations to the maturing, industrial-scale application of generative models within adversarial workflows across threats ranging from espionage and crime to IO. Please see our latest AI threat tracker for more information on how this threat is developing based on our insights, and what Google is doing to protect our customers. Narrative Resonance: Hijacking existing ideological and emotional fissures within a society provides pro-Russia influence actors tailored narratives to target audiences and potentially increases potential engagement and impact. Cyber-Enabled IO: Influence campaigns frequently coincide with destructive cyberattacks, such as the deployment of wiper malware alongside website defacements containing false surrender messages, or the historic use of "hack and leak" campaigns in which exfiltrated data, sometimes manipulated, is then publicized through an actor-controlled false persona. In some instances, Russian actors may even leverage direct cyber espionage targeting as a way to achieve psychological effects, intending to influence victims' behavior through intimidation. Media Mimicry: Pro-Russia actors have attempted to mimic legitimate media at scale and through a variety of means, including via the wholesale appropriation of legitimate media brands or developing inauthentic media brands that generally masquerade as independent news sources. These tactics are intended to add a veneer of legitimacy to the promoted narratives. Direct Dissemination: Pro-Russia influence actors have used closed communication channels, such as emails, SMS text messages, and messenger apps, to disseminate various types of pro-Russia narratives as an adjunct to or outside typical social media-focused operations. Core Ecosystem Components The current pro-Russia influence ecosystem operates across a spectrum from official government communications to deniable covert actions conducted by intelligence services and "patriotic" proxies. GTIG identified six core components that represent key activity types (Figure 3). While many elements are state-directed or state-affiliated, the ecosystem is also a cultivated, self-sustaining system: various actors, often without explicit direction, amplify Kremlin-friendly narratives and pursue actions that advance Russia's strategic interests. This fluidity provides resilience and complicates attribution, mirroring the longstanding Kremlin strategy to co-opt non-state actors, including criminal networks for finance or illicit logistics, to achieve state objectives without direct attribution. Although each of the core ecosystem components serves as a unique lever the Russian Government can employ to achieve desired objectives, they are regularly used together. For instance, while the entire pro-Russia hacktivist landscape is not state-sponsored, the Russian intelligence services have used both genuine and fabricated hacktivist personas to launder stolen data as part of blended cyber espionage and IO hybrid operations. Figure 3: Core components of the pro-Russia influence ecosystem An Interconnected Ecosystem Enhances Influence Utility Figure 4 illustrates the complex, interconnected nature of the pro-Russia influence ecosystem by mapping relationships between a selection of key actors and organizations across five of the core components. The ecosystem functions as a cohesive unit, not only through shared objectives, but also through direct cross-component interactions. The Russian Government functions as the sixth core ecosystem component, setting the policy and talking points that inform the ecosystem’s promoted narratives and sponsoring overt and covert assets throughout the other five components diagrammed in Figure 4. Through these levers, the Kremlin fosters the cross-component links that underpin the ecosystem, enhancing its overall utility as a versatile tool of state influence. Figure 4: Subset of actors that illustrate how different components of the ecosystem interact with each other 10 Key Dynamics for Understanding the Pro-Russia Influence Ecosystem The scope and diversity of activity in the pro-Russia influence ecosystem challenges defenders tasked with enumerating, tracking, and countering its threats. GTIG has distilled 10 key ecosystem dynamics based on our current understanding of its components and how they each enable covert influence activity. These dynamics frame critical aspects of how activity manifests within the ecosystem, providing a high-level guide to understand and track these threats. Large-scale IO campaigns are an integral element of the pro-Russia influence ecosystem. Major pro-Russia IO campaigns have been an enduring feature of the pro-Russia ecosystem, with new campaigns emerging as previous ones fall into inactivity. Maintaining extensive IO campaigns and their associated established influence infrastructure enables proactive messaging on strategic issues and underpins a capability that can be rapidly adapted for emerging domestic and global priorities. Long-established IO campaigns, like Secondary Infektion, pivoted to meet new strategic needs as Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine began. New IO campaigns, such as “Operation Overload,” subsequently emerged to support the war effort; while Secondary Infektion has become dormant, these “successor” campaigns have since been leveraged to advance other global Russian influence objectives beyond the war itself. Pro-Russia actors often prioritize persistence and the range of tactics they leverage reflects this. In the face of public exposure and disruption, pro-Russia actors and their infrastructure have often remained persistent, sometimes making tactical adjustments to mitigate the effects of detection and disruption and other times continuing operations unabated. These persistence tactics include the Doppelganger campaign and overt Russian media’s respective cycling of domain infrastructure and/or use of mirror domains to overcome exposure, platform bans and sanctions. Influence operators also frequently continue using compromised assets, sometimes mocking their exposure, as seen with the legacy US-targeted NAEBC campaign and the APT44-affiliated hacktivist persona XakNet Team. Figure 5: NAEBC-linked persona account mocking public exposure of influence assets (left), and GRU-sponsored XakNet Team persona mocking then-Mandiant (now part of Google Threat Intelligence Group) attribution of the group’s activities to the GRU (right) Pro-Russia and Russian cyber espionage groups leverage IO tactics to support their operations and weaponize stolen data and/or illicit access. While less frequent, this hybrid activity is a critical dynamic within the pro-Russia influence ecosystem. GTIG has previously observed operations used to shape narratives around cyberattacks and influence events on the ground and to conduct foreign political interference, including the repeated targeting of foreign elections, reported in Spring 2024. We have attributed some observed instances of this to Russian government-sponsored threat actors. Russian state sponsored or pro-Russia hacktivist groups have long relied on public advertisement of real or claimed data exfiltration to highlight their operations, intimidate targets, or sway public opinion. In 2022, UNC4057 (COLDRIVER) used data stolen from espionage targets in a high profile hack-and-leak operation seeking to exacerbate divisions in UK politics. More recently, the self-proclaimed hacktivist group PalachPro claimed in February 2026 to have gained unauthorized access to a Ukrainian government online portal and publicly posted screenshots of the claimed compromise. The Ukrainian government has previously noted that the portal does not store the type of data the threat actor claimed to compromise, suggesting the public posting was likely intended as influence activity, attempting to create the illusion of a more serious threat. Figure 6: UNC4057 leak website attempting to inflame public debate Pro-Russia hacktivists serve a direct influence function. Modern pro-Russia hacktivism has evolved into an important component of the influence ecosystem that blends state-backed actors leveraging hacktivist tactics with an evolving cohort of likely third-party hacktivist actors that support Russia's geopolitical interests. Pro-Russia hacktivist groups gain domestic and foreign attention for strategic messaging via their claimed threat activity, amplify narratives directly seeded in overt ecosystem segments, and at times also support traditional IO activity or create a means of plausible deniability for state-sponsored espionage actors. The self-proclaimed hacktivist group NoName057(16) emerged following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, primarily targeting Ukraine and its partners and allies with DDoS attacks and various network intrusions. It has targeted high profile events, such as the Milano Cortina Winter Olympics, institutions like the French National Assembly, and critical infrastructure and transportation targets in Germany. Often their messaging cites grievances with overt acts of Western support for Kyiv, suggesting the group advances Russian interests not only through the targeting of perceived Russian adversaries but also in gaining attention for its pro-Russia messaging. Established ecosystem components facilitate the cultivation of new assets and activity. Inter-ecosystem cross-promotion helps overcome challenges of audience building by directing traffic toward new assets, operations, and narratives, enabling rapid deployment of new and existing IO capabilities. This directly supports a self-sustaining cycle that maintains and expands the ecosystem. The hacktivist persona JokerDNR played a significant role in amplifying the APT44-linked persona Solntsepek when its doxxing-focused Telegram channel first launched and then again as it began claiming cyber espionage activity. Domestic Russian audiences are a longstanding target of the pro-Russia influence ecosystem. Internally directed influence activity has often involved the promotion of Kremlin policies and talking points and the denigration of opposition voices and ideas, conducted by both overt and covert segments of the ecosystem. Ahead of Russia’s March 2024 presidential election, GTIG identified the hybrid espionage and influence actor UNC5101 register domains and conduct associated influence operations attempting to deceive Russian opposition voters about the timing of an anti-Putin protest. Ecosystem actors respond to the same set of internal shifting circumstances and external geopolitical developments, often leading to seemingly similar, but ultimately distinct, activity. These shared drivers and general motivational alignments encourage actors to "spontaneously" coalesce around a particular topic or narrative. While this can appear superficially similar, this phenomenon is distinct from instances of actor coordination and campaign linkages, which is less common. Systemic flexibility is a central feature, with influence assets able to mobilize both incrementally and at scale to advance Russian interests. The Russian Government is able to mobilize assets across the ecosystem to respond to strategic events. Meanwhile, individual or aligned actors can separately mobilize to address tactical needs, allowing the ecosystem to concurrently message on multiple issues across different geographies (Figure 7). Russia demonstrated its ability to focus the ecosystem on a single strategic issue like the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Simultaneously, discrete assets have addressed tactical events, such as when Portal Kombat briefly promoted narratives about a Russian drone incursion into Poland concurrently with other covert pro-Russia influence activity. Figure 7: Tactical responses are executed by individual or coordinated/aligned clusters of actors to address emerging developments Overt Russian media contributes to, and is connected with, multiple covert influence components. The overt components of Russia's influence infrastructure play a critical role within the broader Russian influence ecosystem beyond the commonly understood function of providing a public platform for government-aligned narratives and official talking points; overt media helps to drive (inform targeting) and amplify covert pro-Russia influence activity, seeding desirable narratives within the ecosystem and providing an indirect conduit between the Kremlin and a disparate array of influence actors. Overt media outlets have directly coordinated their activity with covert actors and have increasingly employed IO tactics to disseminate their own content in the face of sanctions and platform bans (Figure 8). US Government sanctions in late 2024 indicated that Russian state media company Russia Today (RT) directly conducted covert influence operations, including on behalf of the Russian intelligence services. Further, RT employees reportedly interacted with members of the self-proclaimed hacktivist group RaHDit, which has claimed to collaborate with multiple other pro-Russia hacktivist groups, illustrating the layered connections between overt media, Russian intelligence services, and hacktivist groups. Figure 8: Overt Russian media maintains multiple links with the covert segments of the ecosystem Outsourcing IO capability development and campaign execution to third-party organizations and proxies enables scaling and obfuscation. Outsourcing is used for developing custom tooling and bolstering both human and organizational capacity. While custom tool development facilitates operators in all phases of the IO lifecycle, Russian government actors can flexibly leverage different models for outsourcing campaign execution based on their specific needs. Proxy actors can also generate plausible deniability (Figure 9). GTIG reported how Russian IT contractor NTC Vulkan (Russian: НТЦ Вулкан) worked with the Russian intelligence services, including providing tooling and support for the GRU unit that sponsors APT44 activity. Separately, US government sanctions detailed how the Doppelganger campaign is supported by multiple Russian contractors under the sponsorship of the Russian Presidential Administration. Figure 9: Outsourcing and proxies support capability development and campaign execution for covert influence activity Conclusion Multiple factors are propelling the evolution of the pro-Russia influence ecosystem we have observed since Moscow’s full scale invasion of Ukraine four years ago. The Kremlin mobilized the entire ecosystem to support the ongoing conflict, which has provided rapid feedback and driven significant investment in new and established overt and covert influence assets. At the same time, pro-Russia actors are increasingly experimenting with generative AI to enhance their workflows. This condensed period of adaptation, alongside signals suggesting Russia's growing reliance on IO tactics to navigate new challenges, raises concerns regarding how a potentially diversifying pool of actors will leverage advancements in tradecraft and scalability. As Russia seeks to emerge from international isolation and reorients its influence ecosystem back toward global objectives, it is critical for defenders to understand how this ecosystem provides the Kremlin with a durable influence capability in order to better anticipate future Russian influence threats. Additional Tools and Resources For mitigation and hardening recommendations, please review the following: How to Understand and Action Mandiant's Intelligence on Information Operations Proactive Preparation and Hardening to Protect Against Destructive Attacks Linux Endpoint Hardening to Protect Against Malware and Destructive Attacks Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Protection Recommendations Google offers a suite of free of cost tools to help protect high-risk users from the most pervasive digital attacks, to which politicians, journalists, and campaigns are often most vulnerable. Examples include protecting accounts from targeted attacks with Advanced Protection Program and safeguarding campaign websites from DDoS attacks with Project Shield.