Full Report
A vision of Army units launching long-range one-way attack drones at enemy warships and ballistic missiles in the Pacific and Europe is taking shape. The post The Army’s Plan For Employing LUCAS Kamikaze Drones Against Its Adversaries appeared first on TWZ.
Analysis Summary
# Main Topic
U.S. Army plans to employ LUCAS (Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System) long-range, one-way attack drones against adversary warships, ballistic missiles, and land targets in the Pacific and Europe. The plan was discussed at the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) annual symposium in October 2026. LUCAS is a U.S. reverse-engineered version of the Iranian-designed Shahed-136.
## Key Points
- **Fielding timeline:** The U.S. military announced it had begun fielding LUCAS in December 2025, months after TWZ argued for acquiring Shahed-136 clones in large volumes.
- **Combat use:** LUCAS made its official combat debut in the opening phases of major combat operations against Iran earlier in 2026. The CENTCOM commander reportedly praised the drones as "indispensable."
- **System design:** The drones are pusher-propeller, combustion-engine-powered kamikaze munitions. They launch from static launchers that can be placed on the ground or installed on ships, and use a small rocket booster.
- **Training integration:** The Army is incorporating long-range one-way attack drones into training at the Bayonet Academy, a training area at Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM), Washington. Training covers maintenance, employment, and orchestration to achieve effects.
- **Doctrinal rationale:** Maj. Gen. Bernard Harrington, commander of the 7th Infantry Division and the Multi-Domain Command-Pacific (MDC-PAC), said LUCAS-type munitions deliver mass effects affordably. They also allow more exquisite munitions to be preserved for targets that require them.
- **Organizational context:** The 7th Infantry Division and 1st Multi-Domain Task Force were consolidated under MDC-PAC earlier in 2026. The Army's Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs), now four in number, are at the forefront of fielding long-range strike and other advanced capabilities.
- **Target set:** The concept targets PLA naval and missile assets within China's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) bubbles in the Western Pacific. Europe is also referenced as a theater of employment.
## Threat Actors
- **Adversaries referenced (not threat actors in the traditional sense):**
- **People's Liberation Army (PLA):** Its A2/AD network in the Western Pacific is the primary planning scenario for LUCAS employment, and it is reportedly expanding (including SAM sites built into bunkers).
- **Iran:** Context for LUCAS's combat use and for the Shahed-136 design lineage.
- **Motivation:** This is an offensive U.S. capability development effort. The article does not describe any malicious actor campaign.
## TTPs
- **Long-range one-way attack:** Single-use, kamikaze-style strikes against warships, ballistic missiles, and other targets.
- **Mass, low-cost employment:** Using relatively cheap munitions in volume to saturate or overwhelm defenses and reserve high-end munitions for high-value targets.
- **Flexible launch options:** Static launchers positioned on the ground or mounted on ships.
- **Joint and multi-domain integration:** Employment as part of a joint force playbook, coordinated through MDTFs and MDC-PAC.
- **MITRE ATT&CK:** Not applicable. This is a military capability article, not a cyber intrusion report.
## Affected Systems
- **Offensive systems:** LUCAS drones, static launchers (ground-based and shipborne), and associated support equipment.
- **U.S. Army units:** 7th Infantry Division, 1st Multi-Domain Task Force (now under MDC-PAC), and the broader MDTF structure (four units).
- **Adversary assets targeted in concept:** PLA warships, ballistic missile systems, and A2/AD infrastructure in the Western Pacific. Targets in Europe are also referenced but not detailed in the available text.
- **Scope:** Planned, operational-level employment across the Pacific and Europe. The article describes doctrine and training development, not a deployed campaign against specific targets.
## Mitigations
The article does not describe defensive measures against LUCAS-type threats. Relevant considerations for defenders of the targeted systems include:
- **Counter-UAS and layered air defense:** Detect and intercept low-cost, low-altitude one-way attack drones before they reach high-value targets.
- **Naval defense:** Hardening and dispersal of warships, and shipborne counter-drone systems, given the ship-launch option.
- **Force protection of launch sites:** Early warning and rapid response against static launchers.
- **Detection:** Radar, acoustic, and electro-optical sensors suited to small, low-signature uncrewed systems.
These are general recommendations based on the threat profile described, not measures stated in the source.
## Conclusion
This article is a truncated, analytical news piece about a U.S. offensive capability rather than a threat intelligence report on a malicious campaign. It contains no IoCs, no named threat actor groups, and no MITRE ATT&CK mappings. The strategic significance is that the U.S. is scaling a low-cost, Shahed-derived one-way attack capability for use in high-end conflict with China and in Europe. The capability was already used in combat against Iran in 2026. Defenders and planners in the Indo-Pacific and European theaters should treat mass, low-cost one-way attack drones as a realistic employment concept. Counter-UAS, layered air defense, and force protection for naval and ground assets should account for this threat profile.