Full Report
Deep dive into Hive RaaS, analysis of latest samples
Analysis Summary
# Tool/Technique: Hive Ransomware (v3)
## Overview
Hive is a prolific Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation that first appeared in June 2021. The group employs a "double extortion" model, where they both encrypt victim data and exfiltrate it to a "leak site" to pressure victims into paying. The version 3 variants represent a shift toward cross-platform capability, utilizing languages like Go (Golang) to target diverse environments.
## Technical Details
- **Type**: Malware family (Ransomware)
- **Platform**: Windows, Linux, FreeBSD, and VMware ESXi
- **Capabilities**: Cross-platform encryption, automated VM termination, credential harvesting, and data exfiltration.
- **First Seen**: June 2021 (v3 samples analyzed in late 2021/2022)
## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- **TA0002 - Execution**
- T1059.004 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell
- **TA0005 - Evasion**
- T1070.004 - Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion
- **TA0007 - Discovery**
- T1135 - Network Share Discovery
- **TA0040 - Impact**
- T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact
- T1489 - Service Stop (VM termination)
- T1490 - Inhibit System Recovery (Deleting Shadow Copies)
## Functionality
### Core Capabilities
- **Multi-Platform Targeting**: Written in Go, allowing the same codebase to be compiled for Windows and Unix-based systems.
- **Efficient Encryption**: Uses a combination of symmetric encryption for data and asymmetric encryption to protect the keys.
- **Shadow Copy Deletion**: Specifically on Windows, it utilizes `vssadmin` to delete backup snapshots to prevent recovery.
- **Automated Ransom Note**: Drops a "HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt" file in every affected directory.
### Advanced Features
- **ESXi Virtual Machine Termination**: The Linux/ESXi variant includes specific commands (e.g., `vim-cmd vmsvc/power.off`) to shut down virtual machines, ensuring files are not "in use" during encryption.
- **MOTD Modification**: Modifies the "Message of the Day" (/etc/motd) on Linux systems to display ransom warnings upon user login.
- **Custom Encryption Extension**: Appends a specific, often randomized, extension to encrypted files (e.g., `.hive` or a unique string defined in the configuration).
## Indicators of Compromise
- **File Hashes (SHA256)**:
- `f172f51cdb08fc31d4cc213aba90a2581f0954f4fc99a3515feead06c3257ca2`
- `fb91cffedd7d555ca0660b992a43367817ed6bb2d202e1e9218346114d0d9bc3`
- `efccbae3957f57bf31954261d1b13d7e985378e1ff0038cfcc2802b5a94cfa4d`
- **File Names**: `HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt`, `[random].key.[extension]`
- **Behavioral Indicators**:
- Execution of `vim-cmd vmsvc/getallvms` on ESXi hosts.
- Mass file renaming activities.
- Attempts to stop database services and backup agents.
## Associated Threat Actors
- **Hive Group** (RaaS Affiliates)
## Detection Methods
- **Signature-based detection**: Utilizing the provided YARA rules (`Hive_v3` and `Hive_ESXi_v3`) to scan for specific byte patterns and strings like `vim-cmd vmsvc/power.off`.
- **Behavioral detection**: Monitoring for the unauthorized deletion of Volume Shadow Copies and rapid encryption of files across network shares.
- **Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR)**: Flagging the execution of Go-compiled binaries that perform high-frequency file I/O operations in non-standard directories.
## Mitigation Strategies
- **Regular Backups**: Maintain offline, encrypted backups and test restoration procedures regularly.
- **Access Control**: Implement the principle of least privilege, specifically restricting administrative access to ESXi management interfaces.
- **Network Segmentation**: Isolate critical servers and backup repositories from general user segments.
- **Patch Management**: Ensure all public-facing services (VPNs, RDP) are patched against known vulnerabilities often used for initial access.
## Related Tools/Techniques
- **Conti**: Another RaaS that pioneered similar ESXi-targeting techniques.
- **BlackCat (ALPHV)**: A fellow Rust/Go-based ransomware family sharing similar cross-platform philosophies.