Full Report
Super Quik, a US regional gas station chain, has been hit by Russia-linked attackers, who leaked security camera footage and a tranche of internal documents on the dark web. Super Quik, a US convenience and gas station chain, has surfaced on Play ransomware’s dark web blog, the group’s public scoreboard of new victims. Posted on…
Analysis Summary
# Incident Report: Play Ransomware Attack on Super Quik
## Executive Summary
Super Quik, a regional US gas station chain, was successfully attacked by the Russia-linked Play ransomware group. The attackers exfiltrated a significant volume of internal documents and sensitive security camera footage, which were subsequently leaked on the dark web in what appears to be a double extortion scheme. The incident was publicly disclosed when the victim surfaced on the Play ransomware leak site on November 1st.
## Incident Details
- Discovery Date: Unknown (Public disclosure on November 1st)
- Incident Date: Pre-November 1st, 2025
- Affected Organization: Super Quik (US regional gas station chain)
- Sector: Retail / Convenience Stores / Energy
- Geography: Operations in Kentucky, Ohio, West Virginia, and Florida, USA
## Timeline of Events
### Initial Access
- Date/Time: Unknown
- Vector: Not explicitly detailed in the provided source.
- Details: Attackers gained initial access, leading to a data breach and subsequent double extortion.
### Lateral Movement
- Details: Implied capability to move within the network to stage and exfiltrate a large volume of data, including security footage and internal memos.
### Data Exfiltration/Impact
- Date/Time: Prior to November 1st, 2025
- Details: Attackers stole internal documents and security camera footage. This data was publicly posted on the Play ransomware dark web blog.
### Detection & Response
- Date/Time: Public data leaks surfaced on November 1st, 2025.
- Details: The organization was likely alerted to the breach via public listing on the ransomware group's scoreboard. Response actions are not detailed, focusing instead on the public impact.
## Attack Methodology (Inferred based on Ransomware Group Activity)
- Initial Access: Unknown (Likely exploiting unpatched vulnerabilities, weak credentials, or phishing)
- Persistence: Unknown
- Privilege Escalation: Unknown
- Defense Evasion: Unknown
- Credential Access: Unknown
- Discovery: Unknown
- Lateral Movement: Assumed necessary to identify and gather internal documents and security camera data.
- Collection: Gathering internal documents and security camera footage.
- Exfiltration: Transfer of stolen data to external servers for publication.
- Impact: Data leakage and public shaming (double extortion).
## Impact Assessment
- Financial: Not specified, but potentially significant due to investigation costs, regulatory fines, and remediation. Annual revenue cited as $124.8 million, indicating a substantial target.
- Data Breach: Internal documents and proprietary security camera footage leaked. Threats against staff are also implied by context regarding leaked memos.
- Operational: Operational impact is not specified, but data exfiltration suggests internal system access/disruption.
- Reputational: High negative impact due to association with Russia-linked threat actors and public release of sensitive internal materials and security footage.
## Indicators of Compromise
*(Note: No specific IoCs were provided in the source text.)*
- Network indicators: N/A
- File indicators: N/A
- Behavioral indicators: N/A
## Response Actions
*(Note: Specific, documented response actions taken by Super Quik were not detailed in the source text.)*
- Containment: N/A
- Eradication: N/A
- Recovery: N/A
## Lessons Learned
- **Third-Party Exposure:** Given the nature of the data (security camera footage), vendors or partners managing or having access to video systems may have contributed to the data exposure.
- **Double Extortion Risk:** The threat actors leveraged both encryption (implied by Play involvement) and extortion via public data leaks, necessitating robust data governance and recovery plans.
## Recommendations
- **Improve Camera/Surveillance Security:** Immediately review and segment access to security camera systems and footage repositories, as this data was a specific target for exfiltration.
- **Enhanced Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR):** Implement EDR solutions capable of detecting suspicious PowerShell activity or unusual large-volume data staging/exfiltration attempts.
- **Robust Data Classification:** Inventory and protect sensitive internal documentation targeted in the attack.