Full Report
EXCLUSIVE 'Working as intended' for the win … again
Analysis Summary
# Vulnerability: ConfigConfusion - GCP IAM Authorization Bypass via Config Connector
## CVE Details
- **CVE ID**: Not Assigned (Google maintains the issue is "Working as Intended")
- **CVSS Score**: N/A (Internal Google Rating: **S1 Severity / P1 Priority**)
- **CWE**: CWE-285: Improper Authorization
## Affected Systems
- **Products**: Google Cloud Platform (GCP), Config Connector (Open-source Kubernetes add-on)
- **Versions**: All current versions as of June 2026
- **Configurations**: Environments using Config Connector where the Service Account has been granted high-level (Org-level) permissions.
## Vulnerability Description
The vulnerability, dubbed **ConfigConfusion**, resides in the Config Connector Kubernetes add-on. The software fails to perform a necessary authorization check when managing Google Cloud resources. This allows a user with access to a specific Kubernetes namespace to leverage a Config Connector service account to bypass Identity and Access Management (IAM) controls. Consequently, an attacker can escalate privileges to the highest level (`roles/owner`) over an entire GCP Organization, effectively gaining root control over all cloud resources.
## Exploitation
- **Status**: PoC available (detailed in researcher's blog)
- **Complexity**: Medium
- **Attack Vector**: Network / Adjacent (Requires initial entry into an organization's Kubernetes environment, e.g., an exposed container).
## Impact
- **Confidentiality**: Total (Access to all organizational data)
- **Integrity**: Total (Ability to modify or delete any cloud resource)
- **Availability**: Total (Ability to shut down or delete the entire GCP infrastructure)
## Remediation
### Patches
- **No official patch available.** Google has currently declined to issue a fix, stating the behavior is "working as intended" despite the internal S1/P1 severity rating.
### Workarounds
- **Principle of Least Privilege**: Ensure that the Config Connector Service Account is not granted `Organization Admin` or other broad organization-level roles unless strictly necessary.
- **Namespace Isolation**: Strictly limit which users can deploy resources into Kubernetes namespaces where Config Connector is active.
- **Audit Logging**: Enable and monitor GCP Audit Logs for unexpected IAM policy changes or resource owner assignments initiated by Config Connector identities.
## Detection
- **Indicators of Compromise**: Monitor for unexpected calls to `setIamPolicy` at the Organization level coming from a Google Cloud Managed Service Account associated with Config Connector.
- **Detection methods**: Use tools like Forseti Security or GCP Security Command Center to alert on changes to Organization-level IAM policies.
## References
- **Researcher Blog**: hxxps[://]olearysec[.]com/research/config-connector-authorization-bypass
- **Google Issue Tracker**: (Internal P1/S1 status)
- **Related Research (Jenga Vulnerabilities)**: hxxps[://]www[.]tenable[.]com/blog/confusedcomposer-a-privilege-escalation-vulnerability-impacting-gcp-composer