Full Report
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued guidance for... The post CISA, FBI warn critical infrastructure operators of third-party ICS risks, urge least privilege and remote access controls appeared first on Industrial Cyber.
Analysis Summary
# Best Practices: Managing Third-Party ICS Integrator Risks
## Overview
These practices address the cybersecurity and supply-chain risks introduced when critical infrastructure operators grant third-party Industrial Control System (ICS) integrators access to their operational environments. The goal is to prevent threat actors from using integrator access as a pivot point to exfiltrate SCADA schematics or disrupt physical processes.
## Key Recommendations
### Immediate Actions
1. **Apply Least Privilege (PoLP):** Audit all integrator accounts and restrict access to the absolute minimum necessary for their specific tasks. Remove administrative rights where not required for daily operation.
2. **Secure Remote Access:** Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for all integrator remote connections and ensure these connections are monitored in real-time.
3. **Validate Backups:** Ensure offline, immutable backups of ICS configurations and logic are available and tested.
4. **Identify Internet-Facing Assets:** Minimize or eliminate direct internet exposure of ICS devices and integrator workstations.
### Short-term Improvements (1-3 months)
1. **Asset Inventory:** Create a comprehensive inventory of all hardware and software components supplied or managed by third-party integrators.
2. **Risk Assessment:** Conduct a formal risk assessment of current integrator contracts, specifically evaluating what data they store and where it is located.
3. **Logging and Monitoring:** Implement enhanced logging for third-party access sessions to detect unusual search terms (e.g., "SCADA," "schematic," "customer list").
4. **Manual Overrides:** Test and document manual operating procedures to ensure critical processes can continue if the integrator’s digital tools are compromised.
### Long-term Strategy (3+ months)
1. **Supply Chain Contractual Requirements:** Update all Master Service Agreements (MSAs) to include specific cybersecurity performance goals, incident notification requirements, and right-to-audit clauses.
2. **Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE):** Shift from purely network-based protection to engineering out potential consequences of a breach at the design level.
3. **Zero Trust Architecture:** Work toward a Zero Trust model for OT environments where every access request is verified, regardless of whether it originates from a trusted integrator.
## Implementation Guidance
### For Small Organizations
- Focus on **visibility**. Maintain a simple spreadsheet of who has remote access and manually disable accounts when not in active use.
- Prioritize **manual resilience**. Ensure staff know how to operate equipment without the integrator's software interface.
### For Medium Organizations
- Implement a **Jump Server** (Gateway) for all third-party remote access to centralize monitoring and session recording.
- Formalize an **Offboarding Process** to ensure integrator credentials are revoked immediately upon contract termination or personnel changes.
### For Large Enterprises
- Deploy **Network Segmentation** (Purdue Model) to isolate integrator managed-zones from the rest of the corporate and production networks.
- Integrate OT security alerts into a central **Security Operations Center (SOC)** to correlate integrator activity with potential lateral movement.
## Configuration Examples
- **Remote Access Control:** Configure VPNs or Secure Access Service Edge (SASE) solutions to time-out sessions after a period of inactivity and require re-authentication.
- **Protocol Filtering:** Use industrial firewalls to restrict integrator access to specific industrial protocols (e.g., Modbus, DNP3) only on required ports.
## Compliance Alignment
- **NIST SP 800-82:** Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security.
- **ISA/IEC 62443:** Security for industrial automation and control systems.
- **CPG (CISA):** Cybersecurity Performance Goals for Critical Infrastructure.
## Common Pitfalls to Avoid
- **"Set and Forget" Permissions:** Granting permanent "Admin" access to an integrator for a one-time setup that is never revoked.
- **Shared Credentials:** Allowing multiple integrator technicians to use a single "Integrator_Admin" account, which eliminates accountability.
- **Over-Reliance on Integrator Security:** Assuming the integrator’s own internal security is sufficient to protect your environment.
## Resources
- **CISA/FBI Fact Sheet:** [cisa[dot]gov/resources-tools/all-resources]
- **Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Framework:** [energy[dot]gov/ceser/cyber-informed-engineering]
- **NIST OT Security Guidance:** [csrc[dot]nist[dot]gov]