Full Report
Welcome to GoGatoZ — a purpose-built Go tool for GitLab CI/CD security auditing that can perform and automate the entire CI/CD kill chain along with everything those one-off scripts did and then some. The post Auditing GitLab: The CI/CD Kill Chain appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
Analysis Summary
# Tool/Technique: GoGatoZ
## Overview
GoGatoZ is an open-source offensive security tool written in Go, specifically designed for auditing and exploiting GitLab CI/CD pipelines. It automates the CI/CD "kill chain" by discovering public projects, enumerating pipeline configurations for vulnerabilities, and executing automated attacks such as command injection or secret exfiltration. It is effectively a Go-based port and adaptation of Gato-X (which targets GitHub Actions) tailored for the GitLab ecosystem.
## Technical Details
- **Type:** Attack Tool / Auditing Framework
- **Platform:** GitLab (SaaS and Self-Hosted instances)
- **Capabilities:** Discovery, vulnerability enumeration, recursive YAML parsing, exploit automation, and lateral movement/pivoting.
- **First Seen:** June 2026 (public release date via Black Hills Information Security).
## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- **[TA0001 - Initial Access]**
- [T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application] (Targeting misconfigured CI/CD pipelines)
- **[TA0007 - Discovery]**
- [T1583.006 - Steal Application Access Token] (Searching for leaked GitLab tokens)
- [T1592 - Gather Victim Host Information] (Scanning for runner metadata)
- **[TA0008 - Lateral Movement]**
- [T1570 - Lateral Tool Transfer] (Using CI/CD pipelines to move between projects)
- **[TA0005 - Defense Evasion]**
- [T1578 - Modify Cloud Infrastructure] (Hijacking ephemeral runners)
- **[TA0009 - Collection]**
- [T1552.004 - Private Keys] (Scanning for SSH/Cloud keys in CI variables)
## Functionality
### Core Capabilities
- **Search:** Queries GitLab APIs to find projects based on keywords, languages, topics, or specific code patterns (e.g., searching for `.gitlab-ci.yml` content).
- **Enumerate:** Analyzes CI/CD configurations for security flaws. Notably, it supports **recursive include resolution**, following the dependency chain of YAML files that may be hosted in different repositories.
- **Parse:** A local-only mode that processes scan results, deduplicates findings, and converts formats without requiring active network connections to GitLab.
### Advanced Features
- **Attack Mode:** Automates the exploitation of identified flaws, such as triggering jobs to exfiltrate masked variables, injecting commands into pipeline runners, or targeting specific runner environments.
- **Pivot (BFS Loop):** Implements a Breadth-First Search loop that automatically chains discovery, enumeration, and credential harvesting to "crawl" through an organization’s GitLab presence.
- **Semantic Awareness:** Unlike generic secret scanners, it understands GitLab-specific logic, such as protected branches, runner exposure, and fork-based merge request risks.
## Indicators of Compromise
- **File Names:** `.gitlab-ci.yml` (Target of analysis), `gogatoz` (Binary name).
- **Network Indicators:** Traffic directed toward `gitlab.com/api/v4/` or self-hosted instances (e.g., `gitlab[.]internal[.]corp`).
- **Behavioral Indicators:**
- Rapid, programmatic API requests for project metadata and repository file trees.
- Unexpected pipeline execution triggered by forks or external merge requests.
- Unexpected "echo" or "curl" commands within pipeline logs attempting to exfiltrate `CI_JOB_TOKEN` or other environment variables.
## Associated Threat Actors
- **Red Teamers/Security Auditors:** Primary intended audience for GitLab auditing.
- **Supply Chain Actors:** Tools of this nature are frequently mirrored or utilized by actors targeting CICD pipelines to inject malicious code into software builds.
## Detection Methods
- **Signature-based detection:** Monitoring for the GoGatoZ binary or source code on internal systems.
- **Behavioral detection:**
- Monitor GitLab Audit Logs for high-volume API requests originating from a single token or IP.
- Review pipeline logs for common exfiltration patterns (e.g., `base64` encoding environment variables and sending them to external webhooks).
- Alerts for unauthorized changes to `.gitlab-ci.yml` files.
## Mitigation Strategies
- **Pipeline Hardening:** Disable "Public" visibility for internal projects.
- **Secret Management:** Use GitLab's "Masked" and "Protected" variable settings, or integrate with external vaults (e.g., HashiCorp Vault) rather than storing keys in CI variables.
- **Runner Security:** Use ephemeral, non-privileged runners and avoid running pipelines from untrusted forks on runners with access to sensitive environments.
- **Code Review:** Require mandatory approval for any changes to `.gitlab-ci.yml` files.
## Related Tools/Techniques
- **Gato-X:** The GitHub counterpart and inspiration for GoGatoZ.
- **Gitleaks / Trufflehog:** Used for static secret scanning (integrated logic).
- **CI/CD Command Injection:** The primary technique utilized for exploitation.